

The Shackles of the People of the Sun: Racism, “Military Necessity,” and Japanese-American Internment during WW II

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On February 19, 1942, about two months after Pearl Harbor, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an Executive Order 9066, which authorized the internment of 107,000 Japanese people, two thirds being American citizens.¹ Although it is the responsibility of the government to defend its country, its fear of “fifth columns,” groups that undermine a nation’s war effort from the inside, made the government overlook the fact that almost all Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans, who had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, were loyal to the United States. This fear led the government to strip away their rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and incarcerated them without the Fifth Amendment due process. Their right to question the works of the government, under the First Amendment, was heavily penalized, and their equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment was denied solely on the basis of their appearance and skin color. The overemphasized responsibility of protecting its country, combined with pre-existing racism, blinded the government from acting rationally. The supremacy of military necessity, fueled by racism and ignorance, trumped the rights of its people and forcibly incarcerated them. This is the story of the “prisoners without trial.”²

For two and a half centuries, Japan had been closed to Western influence. When it was forcefully reopened for trade and global influence in 1852 by the Americans, opportunities for social mobility were presented to the children of the “Rising Sun,” as they could move to America to enjoy higher standards of living. Although the Japanese simply wanted a new lifestyle, better than that of their previous condition, they

¹ Philleo Nash, *Report, Japanese-Americans in Relocation Center*, March 1943. Philleo Nash Papers, Truman Library, Independence, 1, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/japanese_internment/docs.php.

² Roger Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1993), 2.

encountered the same problems as the Chinese immigrants. Many Japanese intended to sojourn, make fast money in America, and then to move back to Japan. As a result, most Americans believed that the Japanese were unable to assimilate into mainstream society and seen as solely economic competitors. This misconception made Americans frustrated with the Japanese and verbally abused them with insults and shunned them. This forced the Japanese into ethnic enclaves while coping with the increasing racial abuses. The decades between 1900 and 1930 saw the federal government enacting several laws that limited Japanese immigration. The most notable laws were the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907 that banned entry of Japanese workers into the mainland and the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 that prohibited all Asian immigration. Although the entry of the first generation of Japanese immigrants (Issei) was halted, the number of the second generation (Nisei) continued to increase. According to the 1940 U.S. Census, 126,947 Japanese people lived in the mainland United States.³ Their lifestyle changed drastically, however, on December 7, 1941, the "day of infamy."⁴

The destruction of the American naval fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, by the Japanese destroyed the fragile relationships between Americans and the Japanese people in the United States. Even before Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt already contemplated the incarceration of the Japanese people. In 1936, he wrote a memorandum to his Chief of Naval Operations, stating that

One obvious thought occurs to me ... that every Japanese citizen or noncitizen on the island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or has any connection with

³ Robert A. Wilson and Bill Hosokawa, *East to America: A History of the Japanese in the United States* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1980), 305.

⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Day of Infamy," *Speech to the Joint Address to Congress*, accessed February 15, 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/document.html?doc=15&title.raw=%26quot;Day+of+Infamy%26quot;+Speech:+Joint+Address+to+Congress+Leading+to+a+Declaration+of+War+Against+Japan>.

their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp.⁵

Pearl Harbor turned prewar cautions into grim reality. Many misguided yet prominent journalists and West Coast politicians, such as Earl Warren, an Attorney General of California, and Walter Lippman, an influential journalist, believed that the bombing of Pearl Harbor was only successful due to the assistance of fifth columns. This suspicion against the Japanese was also prevalent among top military officials, such as U.S. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who stated that the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor were due to “the most effective fifth column work.”⁶ This was due to the prevailing suspicions that the Germans had used fifth columnists to gain rapid success in Western Europe during WW II and that Japan also used it for the successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.⁷

However, the circumstance begs the question, if Americans believed that Germans utilized fifth columnism, why did they not target German Americans? The answer lies within the appearance of such people; Americans were often identified as whites and since Germans were white, it was often difficult to discern them from others. The Japanese could be easily dismissed as a “Jap,” once a common negative connotation associated to the Japanese, as their appearance is visually different to that of a white

⁵ Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 390.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 28

⁷ Earl Warren, “Japanese Americans Constitute a Dangerous Threat to Security,” in, *Japanese American Internment Camps*, ed. Bryan Grapes (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2001), 40.

person. By highlighting the different skin colors and cultures, many Anglo Americans dehumanized the Japanese as an inferior race and demonstrated racist views on them.⁸

Top government officials readily found alleged evidence of fifth column activities of the Japanese people but ignored other evidence that did not support their suspicions. President Roosevelt's handling of a Munson Report was such an example. Dissatisfied with the lack of intelligence on the state of Japanese loyalties, Roosevelt appointed his personal acquaintance, John Carter, to commence a thorough investigation on said relations. Carter then asked Curtis Munson, a Detroit businessman, to investigate the Japanese loyalties on the West Coast.⁹ The ensuing Munson Report claimed that the majority of the population was loyal, although it also speculated that there might be few who "will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves."¹⁰ It has been reported that Roosevelt only read a one-page summary, written and added to the Report by Carter,¹¹ and believed that the Report confirmed fifth columnist activities. By doing so, Roosevelt overlooked the key point in the Report that most Japanese were innocuous residents.¹²

Regional military officials in charge of the West Coast defense echoed the concerns in Washington D.C. Congress created the Western Defense Command (WDC) in 1941, led by General John DeWitt, to take any necessary action for coastal defense.

⁸ John W. Dower, "Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures: World War II in Asia," in *The War in American Culture: Society and Consciousness during World War II*, ed. Lewis A. Erenberg and Susan E. Hirsh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 173.

⁹ Curtis Munson, *Japanese on the West Coast*, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation/activities.html>, 1-2.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 11.

¹¹ John Carter, *Summary of Report on Program for Loyal West Coast Japanese*, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation/activities.html>, 1.

¹² Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial*, 25.

General DeWitt believed that the Japanese people should be interned due to their questionable loyalty. He believed so because they were not able to assimilate in his assessment, as “the Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains are undiluted.”¹³

The culmination of these unanimous opinions was the Executive Order 9066.¹⁴ Although Congress and the President deemed this to be military necessity, it is ironic that Hawaii, which had actually been bombed during Pearl Harbor, was not ordered to mass incarcerate its Japanese people. Japan did not bomb the West Coast but 107,000 Japanese people living there were ordered to evacuate under the Order. The decision not to incarcerate the Hawaiian Japanese was based entirely upon the concern for the Hawaiian economy that was mainly Japanese driven agriculture. Interning the mainland Japanese people lacked any rational basis, considering the fact that they constituted two percent of the total population of the West Coast, whereas one out of every three Hawaiians was of Japanese descent.

The government that had the responsibility of enforcing the Constitution as the supreme law of the land was now ignoring it in the name of military necessity. Top government officials believed that they carried out their responsibility to “provide for common defense” according to the Constitution Preamble.¹⁵ In Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution further provides that it will “guarantee to every State a republican form of

¹³ Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*, 391.

¹⁴ President Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Executive Order 9066*, accessed March 15, 2014, <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=74&page=transcript>.

¹⁵ U.S. Constitution, preamble.

government and shall protect each of them against invasion.”¹⁶ However, pre-existing bigotry in conjunction with the fear of fifth columnists convinced several journalists and politicians that the removal of Japanese people was necessary for the safety of America. They spent countless hours searching for loopholes to incarcerate them. For example, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy stated, “If it is a question of the safety of the country and the Constitution ... Why, the Constitution is just a scrap of paper to me.”¹⁷

The internment of the Japanese people stripped of their basic rights. The Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments were all blatantly ignored. The Fifth Amendment ensures that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” but was violated under the pretense of military necessity.¹⁸ The Order allowed the imprisonment of the Japanese people solely without any individual suspicion and hearing because of their Japanese origins. The equal protection clause under the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees no racial discrimination, was also ignored.¹⁹ A single racial group was incarcerated *en masse*, whereas immigrants and American citizens of German and Italian descent were individually suspected and incarcerated.²⁰

Government raids and orders for relocation denied the Japanese people of protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures” under the Fourth Amendment.²¹ The WDC permitted warrantless raids and searches of Japanese people’s homes and forced them to be constantly under surveillance for the sake of military necessity. The

¹⁶ U.S. Constitution, art. IV, § 4.

¹⁷ Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial*, 40.

¹⁸ U.S. Constitution, amend. X.

¹⁹ U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV

²⁰ Stephen Fox, *America’s Invisible Gulag: A Biography of German American Internment & Exclusion in World War II* (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), xvi. 11,000 German Americans were interned during World War II.

²¹ U.S. Constitution, amend. IV.

Japanese people were then told to dispose all their belongings and property within one week. They were then taken to temporary “relocation centers,” where they resided in cramped conditions without any privacy. Soon after they were sent to internment camps, but never told once of their “crime.” Most of them found their forced relocation to be difficult. The ten camps located in mainly California and other Western states were isolated from society with armed sentries and barbed fences (See Figure 1).²² The conditions were spartan. The Japanese people were not used to extreme winters and summers, but as a popular saying went, they felt “shikata ga nai,” loosely translated as “it cannot be helped.”²³

Although they were unhappy and in almost all cases angry with this displacement, most of the Japanese people quietly went to the internment camps without much resistance. For most, the incarceration order was so devastating, incomprehensible, and swift that many were in awe at what occurred. They simply believed that they had no choice and could not voice their protest. Others who had been long harassed by their bigoted neighbors believed that they would be safer wherever their government sent them. For some, they simply followed a fundamental aspect of their Japanese heritage: forbearance. A Nisei put this concept into stark terms: “It doesn’t do any good to transmit bitterness ... If it’s hard, you go through it. You bear up. It’s kind of like the Samurai spirit. You don’t whine. You don’t complain.”²⁴

While most Japanese passively reacted to the relocation, there were a select few who articulated their views on it and acted accordingly. Some Nisei tried to fulfill their

²² Specifically speaking, the states where the internment camps were located include: California, Arizona, Idaho, Colorado, Arkansas, Utah, and Wyoming.

²³ Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*, 210.

²⁴ Martin Sandler, *Imprisoned: The Betrayal of Japanese Americans during World War II* (New York: Walker Books, 2013), 46.

primary responsibility as a citizen: to obey government orders. Despite being incarcerated by their country, they still felt patriotic and tried to prove their loyalty.²⁵ Many Nisei volunteered to join the 442nd Regiment and fought in Europe and Asia. In contrast, some decided to carry out another responsibility as a citizen: struggle to maintain their rights. There were several cases, in which nonviolent protestors argued against the validity of incarceration. The three major cases that made it to the U.S. Supreme Court were *Hirabayashi vs. U.S.* (June 21, 1943), *Korematsu vs. U.S.*, and *Ex parte Endo* (both decided on December 18, 1944).

Gordon Hirabayashi, a Nisei Quaker, was the first to challenge a military curfew in California. Hirabayashi believed that the curfew violated his right as an American citizen and deliberately broke it. His challenge reached the U.S. Supreme Court where the Court ruled unanimously in favor of the government in 1943. Chief Justice Harlan Stone, who composed the opinion, stated that the dilemma was not Hirabayashi's rights but whether America had the "power to wage war successfully."²⁶ The Court believed that protection of the country came before the rights of its people, as a conquered country could not defend the rights of its people. With this decision, the Court essentially stamped its approval of the supremacy of military necessity. Justice Hugo Black reaffirmed the *Hirabayashi* case ruling by reciting the Court's rationale in the *Korematsu* case:

To apply the curfew order against none but citizens of Japanese ancestry amounted to a constitutionally prohibited discrimination solely on account of race. To these questions, we gave the serious consideration which their importance justified. We upheld the curfew order as an exercise of the power of the government to take steps necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage threatened by Japanese attack.²⁷

²⁵ Brian Dempster, *Making Home from War: Stories of Japanese American Exile and Resettlement* (Berkeley: Heyday, 2010), ix.

²⁶ Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial*, 59.

²⁷ *Korematsu v. U.S.*, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), 217.

While the *Hirabayashi* case simply held that the curfew was legal, the *Korematsu* and *Endo* cases specifically dealt with the mass incarcerations. Fred T. Korematsu was arrested for his failure to comply with the relocation order. His legal appeal of the arrest reached the Supreme Court in December 1944, which ruled in favor of the government 6-3. Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion, once again did not find that racism was a major factor behind the internment decision by stating that “we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measures.”²⁸ However, three dissenting judges disagreed and claimed that this order was unconstitutional and racist. Justice Frank Murphy reasoned that “to infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that under our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights.”²⁹ Japan was indeed the American enemy, and some Japanese people living in the United States might have been sympathetic to Japan, but not all Japanese people living on the West Coast should be labeled and suspected as the “enemy race.”

The third and final major dissenter was Mitsuye Endo, a civil servant whose brothers were serving overseas. From the beginning, Endo was determined to make a test case. As soon as she arrived at the relocation centers, she applied for a writ of *habeas corpus*. Although she waited for her trial for two years, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that she was indeed loyal and did not deserve to be incarcerated. Decided on the

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 219.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 240.

same day as Korematsu's case, the opinion written by Justice William Douglas held that "loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind not of race, creed, or color."³⁰ Douglas additionally concluded that "it is beyond the power of the War Relocation Authority to detain citizens against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made for a period longer than that necessary to separate the loyal from the disloyal and to provide the necessary guidance for relocation."³¹ The Court's decision in the *Endo* case allowed the Japanese people to begin to "resettle" even as early as 1942. Initially only loyal college students could leave the camps, but all loyal Japanese became eligible to apply for leave. Only about 70 percent of the internees went back to the West Coast, as the WRA tried to widely disperse the Japanese people throughout the country in order to prevent them from recreating ethnic enclaves.³²

Although the majority of the Japanese people attempted to forget the appalling experience, there were some who demanded "redress" under the First Amendment that ensures Americans the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances.³³ They struggled for many years to carry out their responsibilities to dispel the racially-based misconceptions and demanded equal treatments as loyal citizens. It was not until the 1980s when the Federal government finally heeded their requests. A Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, appointed by Congress in 1980, inspected the internment camps and the actions of the Japanese people during WW II. The reports formally recognized the error of creating the camps, and President Ronald

³⁰ *Ex parte Mitsuye Endo*, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), 302.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 295.

³² Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial*, 81.

³³ The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . , or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" U.S. Constitution, amend. I.

Reagan signed a redress bill in 1988, which provided an official apology and monetary compensations.

Competing rights and responsibilities before, during, and after the internment brought the government and Japanese people into conflicts and highlighted the fragility of constitutional protections during wartime. In particular, the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were designed to protect all Americans, but sadly they did not protect the Japanese people from being forced into internment camps. The supremacy of military necessity and national defense trumped the rights of 107,000 Japanese people. The *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* cases affirmed that the military necessity, not racism, was behind the internment.

However, the racism against the Japanese people, deeply embedded within American society, allowed the government to abandon their responsibility to the Constitution. The wartime racism heavily influenced the government officials, who seized the deteriorating military situation after Pearl Harbor to express and have their racist ideas imposed upon America.³⁴ These officials from early on saw the incarceration as the only solution. Racism, combined with the fear of fifth columnism, fueled government paranoia and prevented them from believing the truth that its Japanese people were still loyal. The *Endo* case later broke this misconception and confirmed that they were loyal. The Japanese American internment serves as a reminder that the Constitution is ultimately a scrap of paper as it reflects the hearts and minds of the majority at a given time.

Appendix

³⁴ Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial*, 31.



Figure 1: Map of the War Relocation Authority (WRA) Facilities. Source: <http://www.lib.washington.edu/exhibits/harmony/Exhibit/intro.html>

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 1944.

Korematsu v. U.S. was one of the three crucial cases that challenged the validity of E.O. 9066. The case assisted in understanding the rationale behind the judges in their decision.

Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S 283, 1944.

Ex parte Endo was one of the most important cases that challenged whether the government had the right to incarcerate loyal citizens. This primary source assisted in my understanding of how the Supreme Court Judges thought.

Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 1943.

This case was the original case that began the challenging of the federal government's handling of the situation surrounding the Japanese people. The case particularly advanced my understanding of how even the often dissenting Judge Murphy believed that military necessity was paramount.

U.S. Constitution.

My reading of the U.S. Constitution and amendments allowed me to understand what constitutional rights and responsibilities were at stake during the Japanese-American internment and how the internment put the government and individual Japanese people's rights and responsibilities on a collision course.

John DeWitt, *Lt. Gen. John L. Dewitt's Final Report on the Evacuation of the Japanese*, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation/activities.html>.

General John DeWitt was the head commander of the Western Defense Command during World War Two. His report concerning the Japanese American internment camps after the war demonstrated DeWitt's rationale for carrying out the incarceration of these people.

John Carter, *Summary of Report on Program for Loyal West Coast Japanese*, accessed March 13, 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation/activities.html>.

John Carter was a prominent American journalist that was notably known for his "We, the People" column that concerned the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. This memorandum was important because this was the first and only page that Roosevelt read of the Munson Report and this was the primary reason that Roosevelt was convinced that there was a strong possibility of sabotage due to his trust and strong friendship in Carter.

Curtis Munson, *Japanese on the West Coast*, accessed March 13, 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation/activities.html>.

Curtis Munson was a Detroit businessman that was appointed by Franklin Roosevelt along with others to create a report detailing Japanese sympathies on the West Coast. The ensuing report was important for understanding that although there was a firm

belief that the Japanese would most likely not sabotage their new country, the slim possibility that they would made politicians and prominent people protest for their own safety.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Executive Order 9066*, accessed March 15, 2014, <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=74&page=transcript>.

Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942. The transcript of the text confirmed that this order was carried out for the sake of military necessity.

Philleo Nash, *Report, Japanese-Americans in Relocation Centers*, March 1943. Philleo Nash Papers, Truman Library, Independence, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/japanese_internment/docs.php.

The report created by Philleo Nash highlighted the work of the WRA in the subject of Japanese American internment camps. The report particularly assisted in clearing up uncertainty regarding a couple of statistics such as how many Japanese Americans were actually interned.

Bryan Grapes, *Japanese American Internment Camps* (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2001).

Bryan Grapes is a known author and editor of young adult books. This book assisted me in understanding the rationales behind the men who orchestrated E.O. 9066 and in understanding prominent journalists, attorneys, and politicians.

Brian Dempster, *Making Home from War: Stories of Japanese American Exile and Resettlement* (Berkeley: Heyday, 2010).

Brian Dempster is a Sansei (third generation of Japanese Americans). He is the assistant professor of rhetoric and a faculty member in Asian American studies at the University of San Francisco. This book helped me understand the feelings that the Japanese Americans experienced as they lived in exile and later trying to refit into American society.

Unfinished Business: The Japanese Internment Cases, directed by Steven Okazaki, aired in 1984 (Berkeley: Farallon Films, 1984).

This movie produced by Steven Okazaki highlighted the interviews conducted by Mr. Okazaki to several internees but particularly to Fred Korematsu, Min Yasui, and Gordon Hirabayashi. This documentary assisted in my knowledge of how the Japanese felt throughout the whole process and why they did not protest.

Dillon Myer, *Speech, Evidences of Americanism among Japanese-Americans*, July 7, 1943. Dillon S. Myer Papers, Truman Library, Independence, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/japanese_internment/docs.php.

Dillon Myer was the director of the WRA during World War Two. His speech to a subcommittee of the House demonstrated that there were some in the government who doubted the validity of the incarceration.

Dillon Myer, *Speech, Constitutional Principles Involved in the Relocation Progress*, July 7, 1943. Dillon S. Myer Papers, Truman Library, Independence, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/japanese_internment/docs.php.

Dillon Myer in one of his speeches to a subcommittee of the House defended the validity of the incarceration, insisting that what the WRA are doing is all valid within the Constitution. This speech further my knowledge of the rationale behind most of the decisions made by the WRA.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, “*Day of Infamy*” *Speech to the Joint Address to Congress*, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/document.html?doc=15&title.raw=%26quot;Day+of+Infamy%26quot;+Speech:+Joint+Address+to+Congress+Leading+to+a+Declaration+of+War+Against+Japan>.

The transcript of the text shows that the President during his joint address to Congress called the Japanese bombing on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 as “Day of Infamy.” Immediately afterward, Congress declared war against Japan, and the United States entered World War II.

Secondary Sources:

Roger Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1993).

Roger Daniels is a renowned expert on Asian American history and its immigration who also served on the redress commission for the Japanese Americans. This account was important to my paper as it helped tell how E.O. 9066 came to fruition.

Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989).

Ronald Takaki is an author, historian, and ethnographer who focuses on Asian American history. This book demonstrated the context of what led to the American Internment camps.

Gary Okihiro, *Encyclopedia of Japanese American Internment* (Santa Barbara, CA: AFL-CIO LLC, 2013).

Gary Okihiro is an American scholar on Asian American history and a faculty member of Columbia University on international and public affairs. His book on Japanese American internment camps assisted me in better understanding the Loyalty Questionnaire.

Robert A. Wilson and Bill Hosokawa, *East to America: A History of the Japanese in the United States* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980).

The book collaborated by both Robert Wilson and Bill Hosokawa discussed the entirety of the relationship between the Japanese and America beginning with the frontier generation to the Sansei of the post war era. Their book assisted in my knowledge particularly concerning why immigrants came to America and their conditions leading up to the war.

Stephen Fox, *America's Invisible Gulag: A Biography of German American Internment & Exclusion in World War II* (New York: Peter Lang, 2000).

Stephen Fox was a teacher who taught and wrote about American history for three

decades. His book on German Americans discusses that while Japanese Americans were overall incarcerated, the German and Italian Americans were individually selected for incarceration.

John W. Dower, "Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures: World War II in Asia," in *The War in American Culture: Society and Consciousness during World War II*, ed. Lewis A. Erenberg and Susan E. Hirsh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

John Dower is a renowned historian and author who is famous for works on the Japanese-American conflicts during WW II. His article allowed me to further develop my knowledge on general negative stereotypes about the Japanese and particularly why most Anglo Americans viewed Japanese as subhumans.

Peter Irons, *A People's History of the Supreme Court* (New York: Penguin Books, 1999).

Peter Irons is a writer, civil rights attorney, and political activist. He has written several books on the Supreme Court and constitutional lawsuits. This book assisted in providing information on the cases concerning Hirabayashi, Endo, and Korematsu.

Joanne Oppenheim, *Dear Miss Breed: True Stories of the Japanese American Incarceration during World War II and a Librarian who made a Difference* (New York: Scholastic Nonfiction, 2006).

Joanne Oppenheim is an author with more than fifty books associated to her name and often contributes to NBC's *Today* show. Her book further solidified my understanding of personally how the Isei and Nisei felt during the incarceration through

the usage of quotes.

Kumiko Takahara, *Off the Fat of the Land* (Powell: Western History Publications, 2013).

Kumiko Takahara is a retired Japanese language professor at the University of Colorado. His book delved further into the emotions of the public towards the Japanese whom they considered to be “yellow devils” and other ugly connotations.

Niiya, Brian. "Munson Report." *Densho Encyclopedia*. 19 Mar 2013, 20:31 PDT. 26 Mar 2014, 19:46 <<http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Munson%20Report/>>.

The Densho Encyclopedia was a project created in 2012 to provide information on the Japanese during World War Two. This particular page assisted in concluding and solidifying the evidence that Roosevelt’s alarm for a possible attack or sabotage was primarily due to reading the misguided memorandum composed by his dear friend.

Martin Sandler, *Imprisoned: The Betrayal of Japanese Americans during World War II* (New York: Walker Books, 2013).

Martin Sandler is a prominent American author who has written much about various American history topics. His book concerning the Japanese Americans during the internment era has furthered my understanding of the rationale behind the Japanese Americans’ decision to peacefully go to internment camps.

Oliver Stone, *The Untold History of the United States* (New York: Gallery Books, 2012).

Oliver Stone is a prominent yet controversial American director that has won

several prestigious awards for his movies. His book about the untold history of the United States helped illustrate better the kind of man that guided the WDC in their decision to incarcerate the Japanese.